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Abstract: The author examines the following question in this article: Did the Bush administration lie in
asserting that Iraq had operational weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and linkages to al Qaeda?
Did the Bush administration lie in asserting that Iraq had operational weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and linkages to al Qaeda? This question is a significant one in current public discourse but
attempts to answer it largely founder on the shoals of logic.
Most people asserting that lying occurred point out that intelligence supporting the hypotheses of the
presence of WMD and al Qaeda linkages was publicly communicated by administration representatives
to the virtual exclusion of intelligence not supporting the hypotheses. This logic is based on the premise
that a total amount of information can be segmented into data supporting the hypotheses, not
supporting them, and being largely inconclusive. Once segmentation occurs, a public stance on the
hypotheses should then be taken commensurate with the amount of information in all three categories.
However, such logic discounts the security consequences of the presence or absence of WMD and al
Qaeda linkages. Given that the presence of WMD and al Qaeda linkages would present vastly more
significant security concerns than their absence, a weighting of the amounts of supporting data for each
hypothesis based on the respective consequences could well suggest that what looks like lying was
actually prudent communication about the nature of the threat.
Most people asserting that lying didn’t occur point out that there were many sources—including the
prior Democratic administration—espousing similar views. The probability of there being so many liars
suggests that lying didn’t occur among any of these sources. Other assertions supporting the non-lying
hypothesis include the Bush administration being peopled with misperceivers and True Believers. While
possible, such assertions are necessarily contingent on negative ascriptions of administration
representatives. While, perhaps, accurate, such ascriptions are not necessary and do not have to be
defended as applying to generally high-functioning people in the context of an argument that again links
amount of information with severity of consequence. Moreover, with or without recognizing the
severity of consequence of an hypothesis, one should also note a related observation: that going with
the odds is not necessarily the most prudent decision. This is because the odds are based on situations
at least somewhat different than the situation at hand, and because what may happen more often if
enough situations occur may not happen at all in a specific situation.
In conclusion, supporters of the hypothesis of Bush administration lying may be right about all acts
committed except the calling these acts lying. (See Ackerman, S., & Judis, J.B. (June 30, 2003). The first
casualty. The New Republic, pp. 14-18, 23-25; Berthoud-Papandropoulou, I., & Kilcher, H. (2003). Is a
false belief statement a lie or a truthful statement? Judgments and explanations of children aged 3 to 8.
Developmental Science, 6, 173-177; Dong, A. The method of using logical traps for lie detection and its
mathematical testing. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 26, 176-183; Newman, M. L., Pennebaker, J. W., Berry,
D. S., & Richards, J. M. (2003). Lying words: Predicting deception from linguistic styles. Personality &
Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 665-675; Shanker, T. (June 25, 2003). Rumsfeld says all reports pointed to
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